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The Navy Non-nuclear Ordnance Requirements (NNOR) 
assessment determines annually the preferred inventory 
levels for most Navy munitions.  This requirement 
determination is unrestricted by cost.  Procurement planners 
must then revise multi-year purchasing recommendations that 
satisfy current budgetary constraints (about $2 billion 
annually) by subjectively imposing a series of procurement 
priorities.  This report documents the existing manual 
procurement planning method, expresses this method in a 
mathematical model that is then optimized to mimic perfect 
manual planning, introduces a metric for quantifying the 
capability provided by a given inventory of a munition, and 
introduces the Assessment and Investment Model (AIM) that 
will suggest a multi-year purchasing plan that maximizes the 
capability of the inventory subject to consideration of 
budget, industrial base, maintenance, and NNOR requirements.  
When initial AIM formulations could not be solved in 
reasonable time with commercial optimization software, a 
purpose-built constructive heuristic was devised to provide 
quick solutions.  Experience with this heuristic lead to a 
key insight on how to help AIM solve more rapidly. 
The Navy Ammunition Logistics Center (NALC) wants to 
improve the way it plans procurement recommendations.  This 
thesis was invited by NALC and they have endorsed the metric 
we develop as a better quantitative assessment of inventory 
capability.  We show that AIM procurement recommendations 
are superior to those of existing methods.  The goal is a 
more combat-effective munitions inventory for any given 
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U.S. Navy munition inventories often fall below 50% of 
the requirements revised annually by the Navy Non-nuclear 
Ordnance Requirements (NNOR) review.  Despite annual 
investments of about $2 billion to replenish inventories, 
this deficiency has remained a chronic concern for many 
years.  Faced with an inevitably-infeasible procurement 
problem, how do you best allocate available funds to 
maximize the effectiveness of what you can afford to buy 
and maintain? 
Planning munitions procurements for the U.S. Navy is a 
complicated task with many agencies involved and a 
significant amount of money at stake.  Currently, analysts 
apply a loose set of priorities to data managed in a series 
of spreadsheets to manually allocate budgets and make 
procurement recommendations.  There is no objective 
assessment of the quality of any candidate procurement 
plan.   
We present an objective method for assigning munition 
procurement priorities and a mathematical model for 
determining a procurement plan that optimizes this 
capability of the munitions inventory.  
Each year, the goal of procurement planners is to 
provide the operating forces with an “ideal” weapons 
inventory that gives them the capability to accomplish all 
of their training goals and be fully prepared for any 





Munition procurement and maintenance plans that 
satisfy fleet munitions needs require guidance from many 
agencies and attract attention from outside the military, 
e.g., government, industry, and the media. 
 
Determining procurement recommendations is complicated 
by variable munitions costs that depend on quantity 
discount pricing, maintenance throughput constraints, and 
inventory goals that are unattainable given current 
inventory levels, weapons costs, and munitions procurement 
budget allowances.  This leaves procurement planners the 
task of determining which munitions to purchase in order to 
provide the most “effective” inventory possible.  This is 
currently done through the management of a series of 
spreadsheets and application of some subjective procurement 
priorities.   
Typically, unexpected expenditures from the previous 
year, primarily due to combat operations, are replaced 






















year, primarily for training, are purchased.  Then minimum 
production quantities are satisfied in order to maintain 
the industrial base for weapons production.  Finally, any 
remaining funds are distributed to the munitions that are 
the furthest from their desired inventory counts or are 
(subjectively) considered to be the most essential to the 
combat effectiveness of the force.  Determining this 
priority requires a measure of the capability of a munition 
based on the size of its current inventory.  The metric 
being used now is the ratio of the current inventory count 
to the desired inventory count.   
The current method is manual, myopic, not omniscient, 
and certainly not an optimal application of the rules 
given.  We document the current planning methods and mimic 
them in a mathematical optimization model, called BASELINE.  
BASELINE suggests an annual munition procurement plan over 
an 8-year planning horizon that maximizes the ratio of the 
current inventory count to the desired inventory count. 
However, this metric is too simple.  It fails to 
account for the differences in the intended uses of 
munitions and the complexity of the method for determining 
inventory goals.  We propose an alternate metric for 
assessment of the capability of an inventory:  a weighted 
sum of the four component NNOR munitions requirements --- 
Training and Testing Requirement (TTR), Current Ops/Force 
Protection Requirement (CO/FPR), Combat Requirement (CR), 
and Strategic Reserve Requirement (SRR) --- where each 
weight is determined by the prioritization of a mission 
area for which a munition may be employed.   
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Three mission areas are mapped to the component NNOR 
requirements: 
 
Mission Area  NNOR Requirement 
Training = TTR 
Force Protection = CO/FPR 
Combat Operations = CR + SRR 
 
The ability to satisfy the requirements of any single 
mission area with a given munition inventory is quantified 
in a series of capability scores, each corresponding to a 
percentage of the appropriate NNOR requirement.  We use six 
capability scores (‘A’ through ‘F’) with respective 
percentages of 100%, 70%, 60%, 50%, 40%, and 0%.  The 
mission areas are ordered as primary, secondary, and 
tertiary for a given munition and the desired capability 
score is determined for each mission area in a logical way.  
The NNOR requirement mapped to each mission area is then 
weighted according to the capability score of that mission 
area. 
For example, if a munition is preferred as a training 
round, or for combat, we express this aggregate preference 
and then express how well increasing inventory counts 
achieve this multi-criteria mission requirement:  these 
weighted sums determine an ordinal series of inventory 
count threshold values, referred to as tier levels, each of 
which represents an increase in capability score for that 
munition.  The minimum tier level achieved by all munitions 
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in a given year is used to represent the overall capability 
of the entire inventory. 
Consider a munition with a TTR of 600, CO/FPR of 1400, 
CR of 1000, and SRR of 800, for a Total Munition 
Requirement (TMR) of 3800.  Assume this munition’s primary 
mission area is training, secondary is combat operations, 
and tertiary is force protection.  To achieve a capability 
score of ‘B’ in the primary mission area (training) and ‘D’ 
in the secondary and tertiary areas (combat operations and 
force protection) will require 70% of the TTR, 50% of the 
sum of CR and SRR, and 50% of CO/FPR; 
.70*600 + .50*(1000+800) + .50*1400 = 2020. 
Therefore, achieving this desired tier level requires 
an inventory count of 2020.  In our current scheme, this 
corresponds to tier level 9 out of a possible 16, where 
tier level 16 is achieved when all missions are given 
capability score ‘A’. 
These tier levels are then used in our new Assessment 
and Investment Model (AIM).  AIM is an optimization-based 
procurement decision support system based on an integer 
linear program that suggests annual munitions procurements 
over an eight-year planning horizon to satisfy a variety of 
industrial base, maintenance effort, inventory level, and 
fiscal constraints, while optimizing the capability score 
of the entire inventory.   
Initially, AIM could not complete plans in reasonable 
time with commercial optimization software.  As an 
alternative, we pursued a constructive heuristic designed 
to employ the tier level concept and produce procurement 
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recommendations quickly.  Analysis of this heuristic 
resulted in key insights on how to help optimization 
software solve AIM much more rapidly. 
In comparison with procurement recommendations 
generated by the BASELINE model, an emulation of current 
practice but with maximal effectiveness, AIM offers 
superior plans; AIM achieves a larger total inventory and, 
more importantly, AIM raises the overall inventory 
capability level more quickly during the key intervening 































A comparison of an AIM plan to a BASELINE plan 
illustrates the difference in overall capability of the 
inventory (measured by Minimum Tier Level, that of the 
munitions in the worst shape).  Use of AIM in the planning, 
programming, and budgeting process can provide 
significantly improved capability in the critical years of 
the planning horizon.  
 
AIM is an effective tool for managing munitions 
procurement and generating multi-year procurement 
recommendations by placing priority on munitions whose 
inventory counts result in low capability scores and by 
maximizing the budget available to increase the overall 






procurements xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
maint performed xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
delivered xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
maint due xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
expended xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
maint invent (EOY) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
active invent (EOY) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
tier level 2 5 6 8 8 8 11 11





The AIM-recommended procurement plan invests in 
munitions with lowest tier levels (a measure of the weakest 
capability in our inventory).  The budget allocation 
maximizes the minimum achievable tier level.  “xxxx” 
entries obscure classified data. 
 
The ability to provide objective justification to 
rationalize procurement recommendations should appeal to 
munitions procurement planners who currently struggle to 
satisfy a variety of agencies, each with distinct 
conflicting priorities.   
AIM also has the ability to limit changes to a legacy 
solution in order to conduct basic sensitivity analysis or 
“what-if” excursions.  To facilitate the use of AIM, all 
data management and parameter-setting is accomplished 
through a spreadsheet interface that speeds problem set-up.  
This interface also displays AIM procurement 
recommendations and provides for quick analysis.   
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The AIM spreadsheet interface provides push-button 
support for importing munition data, setting parameters, 
selecting options, and viewing results.  Button #1 imports 
munition data directly from existing files.  At #2 the 
planner can choose to generate a plan for any subset of all 
available munitions.  The table at #3 allows the planner to 
provide budget information.  The set of options at #4 
provide the ability to limit changes to a legacy solution.  
Button #5 exports the data and parameter settings to 
appropriately formatted files used by AIM.  After 
generating a procurement plan (#6), the plan can be 
imported back into the interface for display and analysis 
with button #7. 
 
The use of AIM can streamline planning munitions 
procurement recommendations and result in a significant 
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improvement to the combat effectiveness of our munitions 
inventory. 
The Naval Ammunition Logistics Center (NALC) has been 
instrumental in guiding the development of AIM, and has 
informed us they want to try AIM this fall.
  1
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE MUNITION PROCUREMENT PROBLEM 
Each year, procurement planners in the Department of 
the Navy must decide how to allocate nearly two billion 
dollars to purchase munitions [DoN, 2003].  Their goal is 
to provide operating forces with an “ideal” weapons 
inventory, thereby allowing the Navy to accomplish all of 
its training goals and be fully prepared for any combat 
requirements.  The problem is that current inventory counts 
often fall below 50% of these “ideal” inventory counts. 
Despite such a significant budget, in recent years it has 
been difficult to make any progress toward reaching the 
desired inventory counts.  As a result, the operating 
forces of the Navy must accomplish both training and 
operational missions with inadequate munitions resources.  
In fact, a recent Government Accounting Office report cited 
“shortages of training ordnance as a contributing factor to 
low initial air wing success in the delivery of precision 
ordnance” [GAO, 2001]. 
Munitions procurement planning currently allocates 
money according to a set of priorities.  Unexpected 
expenditures from the previous year, primarily due to 
combat operations, are replaced first.  Next, the 
anticipated expenditures for the current year, primarily 
for training, are purchased.  Then minimum production 
quantities are satisfied in order to maintain the 
industrial base for weapons production.  Finally, any 
remaining funds are distributed to the munitions that are 
the furthest from their desired inventory counts or are 
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(subjectively) considered to be the most essential to the 
combat effectiveness of the force [Fahringer, 2002].  This 
is further complicated by variable munitions procurement 
costs that depend on quantity discount pricing, maintenance 
throughput constraints, and inventory goals that are 
unattainable given current inventory levels, weapons costs, 
and munitions procurement budget allowances.  This leaves 
procurement planners the task of determining which 
munitions to purchase in order to provide the most 
“effective” inventory possible.  This is done through the 
management of a series of spreadsheets.  The current method 
is manual, myopic, not omniscient, and certainly not an 
optimal application of the rules given. 
We have developed a tier-based scheme for quantifying 
munitions inventory capability based on mission priorities 
and target inventories.  With this assessment of capability 
in hand, we have also developed a procurement decision-
support tool, the Assessment and Investment Model (AIM) 
that will generate a multi-year munitions procurement 
recommendation to provide the most-capable inventory 
achievable while satisfying a variety of financial, 
maintenance, and industrial base constraints.  This effort 
has been supported by the Naval Ammunition Logistics Center 
(NALC), a U.S. Navy organization that is interested in this 
tool as a component of a larger effort to improve current 
logistical planning and to continue the transition to 
capability-based operational and logistical decision-
making. 
Initial results show that AIM procurement 
recommendations are superior to those generated by current 
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practice, and that they will result in a more combat-
effective munitions inventory for any given (and, 
currently, almost $2 billion) Department of the Navy weapon 
procurement budget. 
 
B. DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS 
1. Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements (CBMR) 
The Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements (CBMR) 
Process detailed in Department of Defense Instruction 
3000.4 (DoDInst 3000.4) outlines the way military 
departments should determine their annual munitions 
requirements.  In particular, this instruction requires 
each service to determine requirements, by munition, in 
four individual categories:  the Training and Testing 
Requirement (TTR), the Current Operation/Forward Presence 
Requirements (CO/FPR), the Strategic Readiness Requirement 
(SRR), and the Combat Requirement (CR).  The sum of these 
four component requirements is a munition’s Total Munitions 
Requirement (TMR) [DoDInst 3000.4, 2001].   
The CBMR instruction provides further guidance on the 
generation of these four individual requirements.  The TTR 
is defined as the number of munitions required for training 
the force and supporting service programs that ensure that 
weapons and platforms deliver the intended effectiveness.  
The CO/FPR consists of the sum of the munitions required to 
arm forces to conduct current operations and those required 
to meet forward presence obligations according to the 
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) as published in the most 
recent Secretary of Defense Memorandum on Defense Planning 
Guidance.  The SRR is the quantity of munitions needed to 
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arm forces not committed to support combat operations in 
the assigned Major Theater Wars (MTWs), as well as those in 
the strategic reserve.  The SRR also includes any 
additional munitions requirements accrued from treaties 
with allied nations.  To determine the CR, each warfighting 
combatant commander allocates targets to each service based 
on warfighting combatant commander-developed Operational 
Plans (OPLAN) or Contingency Plans (CONPLAN) to support the 
current DPG.  The CR is the quantity of munitions required 
to equip a specified force to its desired military 
capability in order to meet warfighting combatant commander 
objectives [DoDInst 3000.4, 2001]. 
 
2. Navy Non-nuclear Ordnance Requirements (NNOR) 
Established by Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 
8011.9A (OpNavInst 8011.9A), the Navy Non-nuclear Ordnance 
Requirements (NNOR) process estimates the official 
Department of the Navy (DoN) ordnance requirements used for 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and budget development 
in accordance with the DoD capabilities-based munitions 
requirements guidelines.   
The NNOR working group meets annually to revise and 
establish munitions requirements for a ten-year time 
horizon.  Three of the individual CBMR munitions 
requirements are determined with significant input from the 
Navy’s Atlantic and Pacific Fleet staffs.  The annual 
Current Operations/Force Protection Requirement (CO/FPR) is 
determined from the current munitions load for deploying 
Navy ships and the annual deployment rate of such battle 
groups. The Strategic Reserve Requirement (SRR) is 
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similarly-computed based on the current munitions loads for 
a variety of Navy ships in a manner consistent with the 
CBMR definition of the Strategic Reserve Requirement.  The 
Training and Testing Requirement is computed directly from 
requests from the fleet [Fahringer, 2002]. 
In order to determine the fourth requirement, the 
Combat Requirement (CR), NNOR employs a family of computer 
models that is owned and operated by the Chief of Naval 
Operations Office for Warfare Integration, OPNAV N70.  
These models feature both threat and level of effort 
modeling and are based on the warfighting combatant 
commanders’ OPLANS or CONPLANS, and are derived from the 
current DPG.  The munitions requirements generated are 
those necessary to accomplish the destruction of the entire 
warfighting combatant commander-assigned Department of the 
Navy target allocation based on a combination of attrition 
and effectiveness metrics [OpNavInst 8011.9A, 1989]. 
The NNOR Total Munitions Requirement (TMR) is the sum 
of these four components (commonly referred to as the “NNOR 
requirements”).  Three of the four individual requirements 
are based on current deployment practices, platform 
capabilities, or fleet requests, but the Combat Requirement 
(CR) is a result of modeling the Navy and Marine Corps’ 
role in supporting the conflicts anticipated by the most 
current DPG.  NNOR is fiscally unconstrained; these Total 
Munitions Requirements represent an “ideal” DoN-wide 





C. OTHER PROCUREMENT FACTORS 
Of course, the procurement budget places the first 
restriction on the acquisition process.  In addition, 
planners must also consider other constraints to the 
procurement plan, including industrial base requirements 
and maintenance concerns. 
Support of the munitions manufacturing industrial base 
is a high priority.  Many munition components are produced 
by a single civilian source.  Maintaining a consistent 
demand for these components may be critical to the 
financial stability of the manufacturer and is often as 
much of a political concern as a military one.  In these 
cases, procurement recommendations may be required to meet 
some Minimum Sustaining Rate (MSR) for production, 
regardless of actual demand, in order to ensure the long-
term availability of the munition. 
Similarly, the Navy employs both military facilities 
and civilian contractors for the scheduled maintenance of 
some munitions.  A consistent flow of maintenance work is 
more cost effective for the Navy both in its own workspaces 
and with outsourced work.  In this regard, particularly for 
munitions with regularly-scheduled maintenance 
requirements, consistent annual procurements will translate 
into consistent annual maintenance, and will result in 
lower annual scheduled maintenance costs [Fahringer, 2002]. 
Finally, as with most products, the unit cost of many 
munitions generally decreases as the quantity procured 
increases.  This quantity discount pricing provides an 
opportunity to effectively increase the buying power of the 
budget; however the degree to which this can be exploited 
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is often limited by other requirements and constraints on 
procurement and on maintenance capabilities. 
The challenge faced by munitions procurement planners 
is to determine the appropriate number of munitions to 
procure each year.  The restrictions they must consider 
include a limited budget, a desire to support the 
industrial base, regular maintenance requirements, and 
variable munitions costs.  Their goal is to make available 
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II. MEASURE OF MUNITION CAPABILITY 
A. CURRENT PRACTICE 
The primary metric currently used by the Navy to 
determine munitions procurement recommendations is the 
inventory count of that munition as a proportion of its 
NNOR Total Munition Requirement (TMR).  This proportion is 
a surrogate for a measure of the overall capability 
provided by a given quantity of munitions.  A munition 
whose current inventory-to-TMR ratio is lowest will 
generally receive a greater share of the procurement budget 
in an effort to improve its capability score to a level 
more consistent with other munitions.  While there are 
additional subjective influences on procurement allocation, 
this ratio provides the basis for procurement decision-
making [Fahringer, 2002]. 
Using this metric as a measure of capability tacitly 
assumes that a given increase in the relative inventory of 
any two munitions, from the same initial relative 
inventory, generates an equivalent increase in capability.  
In other words, a procurement that raises the inventory of 
Munition A from 35% to 40% of its TMR will produce the 
exact same increase in capability as a procurement that 
raises the inventory of Munition B from 35% to 40% of its 
TMR, even though these weapons may have completely 
different purposes and performance characteristics.  This 
metric assumes that the relationship between capability and 
relative inventory will be identical for every munition.  
As the total munition requirement is a simple sum of the 
four component NNOR requirements, this effectively results 
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in an assumption that each of the four NNOR requirements is 
equally important for every munition – in reality, this is 
clearly not the case.  For example, there are weapons that 
are no longer preferred for combat because they have been 
replaced by more accurate, more lethal, or more reliable 
ones, but which are still in demand for training.  
Similarly, some weapons are preferred for full-scale, high-
intensity combat while they are less likely to be used for 
low-intensity, or force protection roles.  The current 
metric fails to account for this.  
 
B. AIM MEASURES OF CAPABILITY 
For the Assessment and Investment Model (AIM) we 
provide a unique function for each munition to relate 
capability score and inventory count.  This function 
expresses varying marginal utility and mission precedence 
of each munition.  These measures of capability will then 
be used to determine procurement priorities. 
 
1. Variable Marginal Utility 
From economic theory, utility is “a measure of the 
satisfaction gained from the consumption of an item” and 
marginal utility is “the additional utility (satisfaction 
or benefit) that a consumer derives from an additional unit 
of a commodity or service” [Wikipedia, 2003].  Considered 
from a different perspective, “marginal utility obviously 
corresponds to the maximum effort which one will be willing 
to make ... in order to obtain a further unit of that 
commodity” [Page, 1968, p.232].  Variable marginal utility 
is the additional “satisfaction” gained from each 
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additional unit above the number of items already owned.  
So, the cost which one should be willing to pay to purchase 
an additional item should be proportional to the variable 
marginal utility. 
Applied to munitions, consider the requirement for a 
given quantity of munitions with which to conduct an 
activity or a mission (say, training).  If a military unit 
determines that it requires ten munitions to make a 
training exercise worthwhile, and its current on-hand 
inventory is only two, then the addition of a single 
munition may not significantly increase the overall 
training value of the inventory.  In this case, the 
marginal utility of a single additional munition would be 
low. 
Similarly, when on-hand inventory approaches the total 
number required to accomplish all training, then each new 
munition may not represent a significant increase in 
training value.  In particular, when annual training 
requirements are generated, they are often intentionally 
optimistic, planning to take advantage of every possible 
training opportunity and using a generous amount of 
munitions in each event to maximize the training potential 
for a military unit.  In reality, not every training event 
occurs (e.g. cancellations due to weather, maintenance 
problems, scheduling, or conflicts with other events are 
common), and even in those that do, the planned number of 
munitions is not always expended.  Therefore, even with 
less than the “required” training allowance of munitions, a 
unit will often accomplish as much training as can 
realistically be had.  So, when the quantity of munitions 
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already on-hand is near the required amount for that 
mission, the additional value, or utility, provided by each 
additional munition is reduced. 
Taken together, these concepts of variable marginal 
utility at the extremes of an on-hand inventory count 
result in a description of a total mission-related utility 
that increases slowly, then more rapidly, then again slowly 
as the size of the inventory increases from zero to the 
desired quantity.  In this sense, a munition’s utility 
represents the capability to accomplish a single mission 
provided a given munition inventory.  Graphically, this 


















 Figure 1. Mission Capability Score as a Function 
of Inventory Count 
A typical relationship between the mission-
related capability score of a munition and 
the inventory count as a proportion of TMR 
illustrates reduced marginal utility at the 
extreme inventory levels. 
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2. Overall Munition Capability 
To determine the overall capability associated with a 
munition inventory, we must consider that in NNOR, four 
component munition requirements determine the total desired 
inventory.  Just as the principle of variable marginal 
utility could be applied to the Training and Testing 
Requirement (TTR) above, it can similarly be applied to the 
Current Operations/Force Protection Requirement (CO/FPR), 
the Combat Requirement (CR), and the Strategic Reserve 
Requirement (SRR), in each case generating a similarly-
shaped relationship between mission capability and 
inventory level. 
 
a. Mission Precedence 
To consolidate these four functions into one 
measure of overall munition capability, we first determine 
a technique for assigning weightings to the four component 
requirements.  Consider three mission areas:  training, 
force protection, and combat operations.  Training is 
associated with the TTR.  Force protection is associated 
with the CO/FPR.  Combat operations is associated with the 
sum of the CR and the SRR.  Each munition needs to be 
evaluated based on its contribution to these mission areas; 
the mission areas are then assigned to primary, secondary, 
and tertiary “mission precedence” for each munition. 
The US Navy is required to maintain an allowance 
of weapons in order to satisfy treaty agreements with 
allies.  This quantity of munitions is included in the SRR 
requirement and, for purposes of these mission area 
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requirements, the treaty requirement will be subtracted out 
of the SRR quantity to be treated separately.  Therefore, 
the mission areas are defined as follows: 
Training = TTR 
Force Protection = CO/FPR 
Combat Operations = CR + SRR – Treaty Requirement 
 
b. Mission Capability Levels 
Within each mission area, the mission capability 
function can be represented by a series of discrete jumps 
occurring at designated relative inventory proportions.  
These inventory proportions are designed to capture the 
general region of the current munition inventory count and 
the steepest portion of a “capability-to-inventory” curve.  
These capability levels and their associated relative 
inventories are given in Table 1.  This relationship is 
depicted graphically in Figure 2.  
 
 
Mission Capability Score 
Inventory (as a % of 
Mission Requirement) 
Level F (None) 0% 
Level E (Basic) 40% 
Level D (Intermediate) 50% 
Level C (Advanced) 60% 
Level B (Superior) 70% 
Level A (Full) 100% 
Table 1. Mission Capability Scores 
The capability provided by a munition inventory 
is represented by a series of discrete jumps in 
relative inventory count. 
 
  15

















 Figure 2. “Capability-to-Inventory” Curve for a 
Mission Area 
The discrete jumps capture the steepest portion 
of the “capability-to-inventory” curve - 
representing the greatest improvement in 
capability per unit growth in inventory count. 
 
With this metric, the capability of a munition to 
satisfy any of three assigned missions (training, force 
protection, and combat operations) can be categorized into 
one of six descriptive scores (from F, no capability, to A, 
full capability) based on the quantity of that munition 
available relative to the associated NNOR requirement. 
 
c. Capability Tier Levels 
The increasing levels of overall capability are 
referred to as capability tiers.  With a mapping of NNOR 
requirements to mission areas and the descriptive 
capability levels with associated relative inventories, we 
now simply have to apply the inventory percentages to the 
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NNOR requirements in a manner consistent with a “mission 
area precedence” and sum to find the total inventory 
required to achieve a given overall capability.  As 
indicated earlier, any treaty requirements will be 
separated from the SRR requirement and will be maintained 
to the full capability (satisfying 100% of the treaty 
requirement) at all times.  The pattern for computing the 
quantity of munitions required to achieve any tier level is 
shown in Table 2.  While this guide is somewhat arbitrary, 
it represents a reasonable progression through the mission 
capability scores. 
 
Mission Areas Tier 
Level Primary Secondary Tertiary
Treaty 
Requirement 
1 F F F A 
2 E F F A 
3 D F F A 
4 D E F A 
5 D E E A 
6 C E E A 
7 C D E A 
8 C D D A 
9 B D D A 
10 B C D A 
11 B C C A 
12 A C C A 
13 A B C A 
14 A B B A 
15 A A B A 
16 A A A A 
Table 2. Tier Level Formulation 
Progression through the capability scores is led 
by the primary mission area; secondary and 
tertiary mission areas follow at least one 





d. Example Tier Level Computation 
As an example, consider two fictional munitions 
with the NNOR requirements and mission area precedence as 
shown in Table 3. 
 
  Munition A Munition B 
NNOR Requirements     
TTR 600 100 
CO/FPR 1400 50 
CR 1000 600 
SRR 800 700 
TMR 3800 1450 
Treaty Requirement  0 100 
Mission Precedence    
Primary Training Combat Ops 
Secondary Combat Ops Training 
Tertiary Force Protection Force Protection
Table 3. Fictional Munition Requirements and 
Mission Precedence 
Munition A may be a low technology, general-
purpose weapon heavily used in training.  
Munition B may be a more advanced weapon 
preferred for specific targets in combat. 
 
To compute the tier 9 inventory requirement for 
Munition A, note from Table 2 that tier 9 requires a 
capability level of B in the primary mission area, D in the 
secondary and tertiary mission areas, and A for a treaty 
requirement if one exists.  Therefore, applying the 
capability level inventory percentages from Table 1: 
tier 9 inventory level (munition A) = 
.70*600 + .50*(1000+800) + .50*1400 + 1*0 = 2020.
 
Thus, to achieve the overall capability 
represented by tier level 9, munition A must reach just 
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over 53% of its TMR of 3800.  Performing a similar 
computation for tier 9 of munition B: 
tier 9 inventory level (munition B)= 
.70*(600+700-100) + .50*100 + .50*50 + 1*100 = 1015.
 
We see here that munition B must achieve 70% of 
its TMR of 1550 to provide the same level of overall 
capability. 
Figure 3 graphically depicts the complete tier 
level-to-relative inventory count relationships for the 
fictional munitions from this example.  Note that an 
increase in inventory count from 60% to 72% for munition A 
increases its overall capability by only three tier levels 
while a similar increase in inventory count for munition B 
raises its capability by six tier levels.  Also note that 
munition A achieves tier level 15 with a relative inventory 
count of 89% of TMR, meanwhile munition B has significantly 





















 Figure 3. Comparison of Munition A and Munition 
B Tier Levels 
Significant differences are possible between two 
munition-specific tier level functions.  Note 
that when the Munition A inventory count is 60% 
of its Total Munition Requirement (TMR) it is in 
tier level 10.  When the Munition B inventory 
count is also at 60% of TMR it is only in tier 
level 5.  
 
This computation incorporates the principle of 
declining marginal utility and varying importance of the 
distinct NNOR requirements, generating a munition-unique 
relationship between relative inventory count and munition 
capability.  Each munition will have its own curve, mapping 
inventory levels to capability tiers, and the shape of 
these curves will dictate how munitions capability trade-
offs are made in the presence of restrictions.  This metric 
offers a precisely-characterized and rational assessment of 
the capability of a munition inventory accounting for 
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component NNOR requirements and the variety of potential 
uses of a munition. 
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III. ASSESSMENT AND INVESTMENT MODEL (AIM) 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Assessment and Investment Model (AIM) is an 
integer linear program that prescribes annual munitions 
procurements over a fixed (eight year) planning horizon in 
order to maximize munition inventory capability while 
satisfying a variety of financial, maintenance, and 
industrial base constraints.  AIM is written in the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) language [Brook, Kendrick, 
Meeraus, and Raman, 1998].  As input, AIM requires a 
significant amount of individual munition data, budget 
projections for each year in the planning horizon, and the 
munition tier levels.  The output includes recommended 
procurement and maintenance schedules for the eight-year 
time horizon as well as visibility of penalties encountered 
due to violations of so-called “elastic” constraints.  To 
facilitate the use of AIM, all data management and 
parameter-setting is accomplished through a spreadsheet 
interface that speeds problem set-up.  This interface also 
displays AIM procurement recommendations and provides for 
quick analysis.   
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 Figure 4. AIM Spreadsheet Interface 
The AIM spreadsheet interface automates the process of 
importing and preparing data.  Button #1 imports munition 
data directly from existing files.  At #2 the planner can 
choose to generate a plan for any subset of all available 
munitions.  The table at #3 allows the planner to provide 
budget information.  The set of options at #4 provide the 
ability to limit changes to a legacy solution.  Button #5 
exports the data and parameter settings to appropriately 
formatted files used by AIM.  After generating a 
procurement plan (#6), the plan can be imported back into 
the interface for display and analysis with button #7. 
 
 
B. INVENTORY ACCOUNTING AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS 
AIM uses year-end inventories.  For each munition, 
data requirements include the size of the initial 
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inventory, previously-scheduled or contracted procurements 
(by year in which the munitions will be accepted into 
inventory), and planned expenditures.  The number of 
combat-useable munitions that are present at the end of 
each year is referred to as the active inventory count 
achieved for that year.  
Some munitions require regularly-scheduled preventive 
maintenance.  This maintenance is intended to routinely 
detect and correct mechanical and electrical problems in 
munitions that have not been expended after a given active-
service epoch.  When a munition that requires scheduled 
maintenance reaches its maintenance deadline, it is removed 
from the active inventory and placed in the maintenance 
inventory.  When the required maintenance is begun the 
munition is removed from the maintenance inventory.  A 
munition can begin maintenance in the same year it reaches 
its maintenance deadline.  When the maintenance of a 
munition is complete, it is returned to the active 
inventory.  The length of time (in years) for required 
maintenance to be completed is given for each munition.  
The next scheduled maintenance for a munition is based on 




C. PROCUREMENT PRIORITIZATION 
For each munition, the NNOR requirements are pre-
processed to generate a series of increasing tier levels.  
In previous examples, these have been a sixteen-tier 
structure.  In AIM, the tier structure can be adjusted to 
accommodate any number of tiers and any progression through 
mission capability levels.  Simplifying the tier structure 
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significantly reduces the intellectual and computational 
complexity of the problem and may be desirable in some 
cases. 
In any tier structure, the lower bound of Tier 1 must 
represent the minimum inventory allowable (in most cases, 
either zero or the treaty requirement).  The upper bound of 
every tier (except the last) is determined to be one 
munition short of the next tier’s lower bound.  The highest 
tier will have a range of only a single munition and this 
will equal the exact NNOR Total Munition Requirement. 
The annual capability of a munition, measured by the 
tier level achieved by the end of that year, is determined 
by the active inventory for that munition.  The objective 
function in AIM is primarily composed of the minimum tier 
achieved over all munitions in each year; therefore there 
is a significant incentive to increase this minimum tier 
level by raising the inventory count of munitions with low 
tier levels.  This can be done, in the case of every 
munition, through procurement of new munitions, and, in the 
case of the munitions that require regular maintenance, by 
conducting maintenance on those items in the maintenance 
inventory.  When new munitions are procured they enter the 
active inventory after some prescribed delay (given for 
each munition in years). 
 
D. INDUSTRIAL BASE CONSTRAINTS AND MUNITION ‘FAMILIES’ 
The industrial base is modeled using two values for 
each munition, the Minimum Sustaining Rate (MSR) and the 
Maximum Production Rate (MPR).  The MSR represents the 
minimum annual quantity of new munitions procurement 
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required to support a production process.  The MPR 
describes the maximum annual quantity of new procurement 
that can be supported without significant upgrades to the 
production process.  Both of these constraints are elastic, 
and violations of the industrial base constraints are 
penalized at different rates for under- and over-
production. 
Annual munition procurement is semi-continuous.  In 
each year, the total annual procurement must be equal to or 
greater than the MSR, or it must be zero.  Failure to 
support the MSR is penalized with a fixed cost penalty 
applied to the procurement budget in that year - 
representing the cost to the Navy of maintaining the 
capability of the production line in order to make future 
production of the munition possible.  Penalty costs do not 
increase in the case of multiple consecutive years of non-
production, nor is there an additional, explicit ‘start-up’ 
cost when production resumes, as this cost is assumed in 
the penalty cost already paid.   
Violations of Maximum Production Rate (overproduction) 
are penalized by a proportionate increase to the unit cost 
for each munition above MPR - representing the additional 
cost per munition to expand production capability.  This 
additional cost can reasonably be assumed to represent 
mostly overtime wages for increasing the overall production 
time required; however, in extreme cases it may also 
represent the costs of additional machinery, parts, 
workforce, or even facilities.  The penalty proportion is a 
global parameter and every munition suffers a similar 
relative penalty for overproduction. 
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Some munitions are simply different variants of the 
same base weapon.  Examples of this include the many 
variants of the Tomahawk cruise missile and the several 
variants of the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW).  These 
similar variants can be said to belong to the same munition 
‘family’.  Each individual munition (variant) has a unique 
NNOR requirement, but all of the munitions in a single 
family share an industrial base.  In particular, these 
weapons are often manufactured at common facilities, from 
similar parts, and by the same workforce.  In some cases 
multiple variants are manufactured simultaneously, in other 
cases a production line alternates between several variants 
of a weapon.  For munitions such as these that can be 
identified as belonging to a family, the industrial base 
constraints are consolidated in AIM. 
While the munitions in a family are similar, the 
individual variants each have unique costs, and therefore 
do not necessarily represent equivalent per-unit revenues 
to the manufacturer.  In order to account for this, the 
industrial base constraints of MSR and MPR are converted 
from units of quantity of munitions into units of total 
procurement cost.  Then, the industrial base constraints 
for the individual munitions of a family can simply be 
summed to determine the constraints applied to the total 
family.  In the AIM mathematical formulation, each munition 
is a member of a family, and each family consists of one or 
more munitions.  Mathematically, each industrial base 
constraint can be applied to a family of munitions, 




E. QUANTITY-BASED PRICING 
Munition pricing data is given for quantities known as 
‘lots.’  Each lot is represented by a lot count and a lot 
cost; the lot cost is the total cost to procure exactly 
that lot count of munitions.  Each munition can have up to 
ten lots, each lot representing a larger block of munitions 
that might be procured in a single year.  Procurements are 
not restricted to full-lot quantities.  From the lot data, 
unit costs are derived and procurements costs for partial-
lot quantities are linearly interpolated.  In general, 
larger quantities of munitions can be procured at lower 
unit costs and so the munition unit cost curves are 
piecewise linear and generally concave. 
In order to support these computations, each munition 
must be represented by at least two lots.  The first is a 
“zero lot” and expresses the fixed cost penalty for a 
violation of the MSR.   An example of a typical unit cost 
curve and the application of industrial base constraints is 














































 Figure 5. Sample Munition Unit Cost and 
Industrial Base Constraints 
Unit costs generally decrease with increasing 
quantity.  Violations of MPR result in additional 
per unit costs while violations of MSR result in 
a fixed cost penalty. 
 
 
F. MAINTENANCE THROUGHPUT CONSTRAINTS 
Munitions maintenance is performed at either a Navy 
owned and operated facility or at a civilian contractor 
site, and for some munitions can be done at either.  In 
AIM, per-unit maintenance costs are considered fixed, 
regardless of quantity of maintenance performed. 
Just as there are restrictions on minimum and maximum 
annual new munitions procurement, there are also 
constraints on the annual maintenance throughput.  The 
maximum maintenance throughput is defined as the number of 
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munitions that can begin maintenance in a single year, 
across all available facilities, without significant 
improvements to those facilities.  Violation of this 
maximum maintenance throughput constraint results in a 
relative increase in per-unit maintenance costs for all 
excess maintenance. 
Similar to the Minimum Sustaining Rate for the 
procurement industrial base, there is a minimum annual 
maintenance throughput.  However, since a portion of all 
maintenance is performed at Navy facilities (in fact, in 
most cases, Navy facilities are used to their capacity 
before civilian maintenance services are contracted), 
failure to meet this minimum throughput will not result in 
the loss of this capability.  Instead, the minimum 
maintenance throughput represents the minimum count of 
munitions for which the facility operates efficiently; 
below this count the facility is not cost effective and the 
value of the maintenance performed does not justify the 
cost of the facility. 
In AIM, annual maintenance is allowed for any non-
negative count of munitions up to the total available in 
the maintenance inventory from previous years plus those 
due for maintenance in the current year.  Violation of the 
minimum annual throughput results in a penalty equal to the 
difference between the cost of the minimum maintenance 
throughput and the cost of actual maintenance performed, 
multiplied by a scaling factor that slightly increases the 
penalty as the magnitude of the violation increases.  In 
this way, the cost of maintenance performed plus penalty 
will always meet or exceed the minimum maintenance 
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throughput cost.  The scaling factor is employed to provide 
additional motivation to conduct maintenance when possible. 
A maintenance constraint applies to each munition 
‘family’, as with the procurement industrial base 
constraints.  Both threshold values and actual maintenance 
conducted, in quantities of munitions, are converted to 
costs. 
 
G. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
Budget inputs to AIM include an upper and lower bound 
for annual procurement spending and an upper bound for 
maintenance spending.  Constraints on spending, in both 
categories, are applied cumulatively, providing some 
flexibility to ‘save’ some funding from an earlier year and 
apply it to a later year’s activities.  The upper bounds on 
both procurement and maintenance spending are hard 
constraints.  The lower bound on procurement spending 
represents the requirement, in governmental budgeting, to 
spend what is appropriated or risk losing it.  As such, a 
violation of the lower bound on annual procurement spending 
results in a penalty applied in the objective function 
equivalent to a reduction in the count of the overall 
inventory equal to the maximum number of munitions that 
could have been purchased for the amount of money that was 
underspent. 
 Total annual procurement and maintenance spending, 
which include any penalties assessed for violations of 
industrial and maintenance base, are charged against the 
appropriate budget in the year in which the action is 
begun, notwithstanding any delay for the new or maintained 
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munition to arrive in the active inventory.  Future-year 
spending (beyond year one) is discounted according to the 
Office of Management and Budget’s real discount rate for 
cost effectiveness, lease purchase, and related analysis 
[OMB, 2003]. 
 
H. LIMITING CHANGES TO LEGACY PLANS 
AIM is more useful when it can be trusted to revise a 
legacy solution that may already have been closely 
scrutinized without unnecessarily revising too many 
details.  Turbulence in revised solutions is aggravating 
and can lose trust by planners investing a lot of time 
working through complex procurement scenarios.  
Optimization has a well-earned reputation for amplifying 
small changes in inputs to breathtaking revisions.  This is 
unacceptable. 
In order to provide the ability to update solutions 
for future years and to conduct some basic sensitivity 
analysis, the AIM formulation is augmented with some 
additional constraints to allow for modeling with 
persistence [Brown, Dell, and Wood, 1997].  Of particular 
interest is the ability to limit the changes in the number 
of a particular munition to be procured in a given year, 
and the ability to prevent significant changes to the 
capacity of the industrial base as defined in a legacy 
plan. 
To accomplish the former, the quantity of munitions 
procured in a revised plan is restricted by a set of ranged 
persistent constraints [Brown, Dell, and Wood, 1997, p.19] 
that inflict penalties for violations of an allowable 
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relative deviation (above or below) from the quantity of 
munitions procured during that same period in a legacy 
plan.  The range of the allowable deviation can vary 
throughout the eight annual time periods, but is similar 
for each munition. 
To stabilize the capacity of the industrial base, the 
model enforces penalties on any revision in the status of a 
production facility.  In particular, penalties are incurred 
for every facility for which the revised solution results 
in zero production when the legacy solution indicated that 
the facility would be in use.  Likewise, a penalty is 
incurred for each facility that is not employed in the 
revised solution and which was active in the legacy plan.  
These constraints can be applied to any continuous range of 
years but must begin in year one.   
 
I. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
The main goal of AIM is to raise the overall 
capability of the munitions inventory.  AIM achieves this 
by calculating, for each year, the minimum tier achieved 
over all munitions.  The objective function is the sum over 
the planning horizon of this minimum tier, and AIM 
maximizes this sum.  This technique for quantifying the 
overall capability of the inventory ensures that there is 
no capability gap created for one munition as a result of 
overly aggressive increases in capability of the remaining 
munitions.   The result is that, while munitions may start 
with radically different initial relative inventories, the 
AIM recommendation will guarantee some minimum capability 
for every munition in each year. 
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Because the individual tier levels are integer, the 
sum of the minimum tier levels is as well, and this might 
admit a large number of equivalent plans.  In order to 
differentiate between a potentially large number of 
indistinguishable plans, an additional term is included to 
express the relative count of the overall total inventory.  
Summing the total inventory count over all munitions and 
all years, and dividing by the sum of all munitions’ Total 
Munition Requirements, over all years, accomplishes this.   
There are also a number of penalties that are assessed 
in the objective function, including those for 
underspending the procurement budget, for failing to 
conduct timely maintenance, and several that assess 
violations of persistence constraints.  The first two are 
incorporated in the measure of total annual inventory.  The 
overall inventory, in each year, is reduced by the penalty 
for underspending, as described above, and by a fraction 
(fixed for all years) of the total number of munitions in 
the maintenance inventory. 
The persistence penalty for changing the status of a 
production facility is applied as a unit decrease for each 
such occurrence.  The effect is that every production 
facility that is unable to maintain a consistent status 
from the legacy plan to the revised plan will reduce the 
minimum tier achieved in that year by one.  A failure to 
meet the allowable range for individual munition 
procurement results in a penalty equal to the difference 
between the allowable change and the actual change, in 
percentages.  Therefore, the effect of each additional 1% 
change in annual procurement for each munition between the 
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legacy and the revised plan is to reduce the value of the 
overall relative inventory by 1%. 
This basic objective function can be modified to 
emphasize capability in some years more than others.  We 
use this to speed up the search for an initial solution.  
While the formulation of the model generally encourages the 
early improvement of munitions with low tier levels, 
computational experience has shown that heavily weighting 
the early years results in significantly improved 



























IV. EXPOSITORY MODEL FORMULATION 
The expository formulation presented in this chapter 
is a greatly simplified version of the AIM model.  The full 
AIM formulation is provided in Appendix B. 
In this simplified version of the model, the objective 
function includes only the sum of minimum tier levels.  
Additionally, munition maintenance requirements are not 
shown, the maximum production rate is considered a hard 
limit on annual procurement, the concept of munition 
‘families’ is not displayed, munitions arrive in the 
inventory in the same year in which they are procured, 
procurement spending is not discounted in future years, 
elastic constraints are omitted, and the options for 
revising a legacy plan are not included.   
 
A. INDICES AND SETS 
m∈M  Munition, any munition for which NNOR 
requirements are generated, currently NNOR 
considers 190 munitions, we have data for 19 of 
them 
y∈Y Year of the planning horizon, Y={1,...,8} 
t∈T Tier level, T={1,...,num_tiers} 
l∈L Procurement pricing lot, L={1,...,10} 
 
B. DATA 
lot_countm,l Number of munition m in lot l 
lot_costm,l Procurement cost for the full 
quantity of lot l of munition m 
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unit_costm,l Unit cost per munition m in lot 
l.   
min_sust_ratem Minimum production Sustaining 
Rate (MSR) for munition m 
max_prod_ratem Maximum Production Rate (MPR) for 
munition m 
init_inventm Initial on-hand inventory of 
munition m at the beginning of 
the planning horizon 
expendm,y Expected annual expenditures, in 
training and in operations, for 
munition m in year y 
proc_budget_lowy, 
proc_budget_uppy Lower and upper bounds for annual 
procurement budget band in year y 
mpr_pen_ratem Proportional additional penalty 
cost to munition m for exceeding 
its MPR 
tier_lvlm,t,y Number of weapons of type m in 
year y required to reach tier t 
 
C. VARIABLES 
PROCUREDm,y Number of munition m procured 
during year y 
LOT_PROCUREDm,l,y Number of munition m procured 
from lot l in year y 
PROC_COSTm,y Total cost of procurement of 
munition m in year y 
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[ ]ACTIVE_INV  = init_invent ACTIVE_INV -1
+PROCURED -expendm,y




DELIVEREDm,y Number of munition m delivered 
during year y from both new 
procurement and maintenance 
ACTIVE_INVm,y Number of munition m in the 
usable inventory at the end of 
year y 
MIN_TIERy Minimum tier achieved of all 
munitions in year y 
CUM_TIER_REACHEDm,t,y Binary variable, 1 if munition m 
is in tier t or below in year y 
LOT_INDICATORm,l,y Binary variable, 1 if munition m 
is being procured in lot l during 
year y 
MEET_MSRm,y Binary variable, 1 if munition m 
satisfies its MSR in year y 
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   ∑
 
 
CUM_TIER_REACHED CUM_TIER_REACHED , ,, +1, m t ym t y ≥  ∀m,y, (8) 





 ∀m,y (9) 
 
  
E. BRIEF VERBAL DESCRIPTION 
The objective function expresses the sum of the annual 
minimum tier achieved. 
Constraints: 
(1) These are inventory balance equations for each 
active (combat useable) munition. 
(2) This equation determines the total number of a 
munition procured in a given year by summing 
procurements over all individual lots. 
(3) These constraints require that an individual lot 
procurement is no larger in count than the count 
of the entire lot (or the NNOR total requirement 
when purchasing from the last lot) and that a 
munition may not be procured from the next lot 
without procuring the entire previous lot. 
(4) These equations enforce the maximum production 
rate (MPR) for each munition (in this basic 
formulation, production in excess of the MPR is 
prohibited) and determine whether the minimum 
sustaining production rate (MSR) for a munition 
has been met.  A failure to meet the MSR results 
in a penalty on overall procurement spending. 
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(5) Each equation determines the total cost of new 
procurement of a single munition in a given 
year. 
(6) These constraints enforce the upper and lower 
bounds on cumulative procurement budget 
spending.  Annual procurement spending includes 
the cost of new munitions plus any penalty 
assessed for violation of the MSR. 
(7) These constraints determine which tier has been 
reached based on a current (active) inventory 
count. 
(8) These constraints require the tier reached 
indicator variable to be non-decreasing. 
(9) Each constraint determines the minimum tier 





V. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
A. DATA COLLECTION AND SCENARIO 
Data for nineteen U.S. Navy strike munitions has been 
provided by Naval Ammunitions Logistics Center (NALC), a 
sample of this data is included in Appendix A.  Due to the 
security classification of NNOR requirements, all 
references to actual current inventories and requirements 
will be listed as proportions of the NNOR Total Munition 
Requirement. 
Values for fixed and annual global parameters, as 
shown in Table 4 and Table 5, have also been provided by 
NALC except in the case of the discount rate, which was 
taken from the OMB web site [OMB, 2003].  The procurement 
budget values are approximated based on the 2004 
President’s Budget for U.S. Navy Weapons Procurement.  The 
maintenance budget is intended to allow for significant 
flexibility to maintain a majority of the inventory in 
combat useable condition.  While training expenditures for 
future years are estimated, operational expenditures are 
not. The AIM recommendation uses the sixteen-tier tier 








Procurement Budget – Upper Limit 1,100 M$/year 
Procurement Budget – Lower Limit 990 M$/year 
Discount Rate 0.023 
Table 4. Fixed Global Parameters for AIM and 
BASELINE Model Plans  
Procurement budget values are a portion of the 
Navy Weapon Procurement budget from the FY04 
President’s Budget.  NALC determined the 
appropriate value for the nineteen munitions 
considered.  Discount rate is determined from the 
OMB Real Discount Rate. 
 
Years  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Maintenance Budget 
(in M$) 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Table 5. Annual Global Parameters for AIM and 
BASELINE Model Plans 
Maintenance budget allowances increase to 
accommodate a growing total inventory. 
 
B. BASELINE RECOMMENDATION 
In order to provide a benchmark against which to 
compare AIM procurement recommendations, we wrote an 
integer linear program to mimic the current process for 
generating procurement recommendations.  The Naval 
Ammunition Logistics Center (NALC) provided the insight 
necessary to mathematically describe this subjective 
process.  This plan, referred to as the baseline plan, 
applies the set of priorities currently in use by decision 
makers at the Navy’s Fleet Readiness and Logistics 
organization and optimizes the metric currently used to 
measure munition capability. 
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The baseline plan manages an active and maintenance 
inventory and handles maintenance requirements, industrial 
base constraints, spending and budgets.  It employs the 
same variable unit cost equations as are used by AIM.  To 
measure munition capability, for each munition, this model 
tracks current active inventory as a proportion of its NNOR 
TMR.  Annual procurement priorities are:  first, to replace 
expended munitions, then to satisfy industrial base 
constraints, and finally to improve munition capability.  
In particular, the objective function is given by the sum 
of the minimum relative inventory over all years and all 
munitions.  Additionally, it also includes objective 
function penalties for underspending the procurement budget 
and failing to conduct timely maintenance. 
The baseline model automates all of the decisions that 
are currently made subjectively to determine a procurement 
plan.  This plan is the optimal (as defined by current 
priorities and metrics) feasible procurement plan for any 
given scenario.  This model in itself may prove useful to 
current munitions procurement planners. 
  
C. AIM COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Recommendations from AIM have been generated on a Dell 
Precision 340 desktop computer with a Pentium IV 2.0 GHz 
processor and 1 GB of RAM.  AIM is written in the GAMS 
language and is solved with the CPLEX solver, version 7.5.0 





1. Exploration of Heuristics 
Initially, AIM required many hours to generate a 
procurement plan.  The time it took to find a “reasonably 
good” feasible solution was particularly long.  In an 
effort to shorten the total turnaround time we investigated 
the use of a heuristic to identify a good initial candidate 
solution.  This initial candidate solution could then be 
passed to AIM and improved - arriving at the final 
procurement plan much more quickly than AIM was doing 
alone.  Ideally, the heuristic would generate a procurement 
plan that was nearly as good as the AIM procurement plan 
and therefore it might also be used independently of AIM. 
 The heuristic we used was myopic (it looks at only 
one year at a time) and “greedy” (it improves tier levels 
of the minimum tier level munitions every time it can).   
 
a. Brief Verbal Description 
The heuristic follows these basic steps: 
1. For all munitions, in all years, the number of 
munitions procured is set to the Minimum Sustaining 
Rate (MSR) 
2. For years 1 through 8, 
a. Until the annual maintenance budget is expended, 
conduct maintenance for each munition (in 
increasing tier level order).  The number of items 
maintained, of each munition, is the minimum of: 
the number of items that require maintenance, the 
number of items required to reach the next tier 
level, and the number of items possible with the 
remaining maintenance budget.   
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b. Until the annual procurement budget is expended, 
procure additional units for all munitions in the 
minimum tier (in decreasing order of the cost of 
procurement to reach the next tier level).  The 
number of additional units procured, of each 
munition, is the minimum of: the number of units 
required to reach the next tier level, and the 
number of items possible with the remaining 
procurement budget. 
 
b. Heuristic Results 
This heuristic will generate a complete procurement 
plan in only a few minutes.  However, comparison of the 
sums of annual minimum tier levels shows that the heuristic 
procurement plan is not nearly as good as the AIM 
procurement plan.   
While modifying the heuristic and analyzing resultant 
performance, we identified that the heuristic performed 
best when it placed the highest emphasis on the early years 
of the planning horizon.  This realization lead to the use 
of weights in the AIM objective function as introduced in 
Chapter 3. While ultimately the heuristic failed to 
contribute directly by providing AIM an initial candidate 
solution, indirectly it resulted in a significant 
improvement in AIM turnaround time. 
 
2.  AIM Recommendation 
The use of weights in the objective function increases 
the emphasis on early years and significantly improves 
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solution times.  We use an exponential weighting of the 
objective function to find an initial candidate solution: 
(9-y)weight(y) = 2 where y Years.∈    
This initial candidate solution is then provided as an 
incumbent solution to the model to solve again, this time 
with all weights equal.  A typical model for this data 
includes 6,900 equations and 6,500 variables (half of which 
are binary) and solving in this manner generates solutions 
in approximately an hour and a half.  
As an example of how the use of capability tier levels 
is reflected in annual procurements, consider the results 
for one particular munition over the eight years of the 
solution, in this case, the Hellfire missile.  Figure 6 
shows the increasing inventory, both in relative count 




Figure 6. Increasing Capability and Relative 
Inventory of Hellfire Missiles 
Projected annual inventory counts for the 
Hellfire missile are shown in terms of both 
relative inventory (inventory count in relation 
to TMR) and tier level.  For example, very few 
munitions are procured in year five, resulting in 
no increase in tier level from year four.  Steep 
portions of the curve identify significant 
increases in capability for relatively small 
increases in size of inventory. 
 
D. COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
Consider the metric currently in use by munitions 
procurement planners:  the size of the inventory as a 
percentage of the Total Munition Requirement (TMR).  Table 
6 compares the initial inventory count to the inventories 
at the end of Year 8 for both the baseline plan and AIM.  


























graphically in Figure 7.  In thirteen of the nineteen 
munitions considered AIM achieves a larger final munition 
inventory than the baseline model.  Additionally, when 
considering the sum of all individual munition inventories 
as a whole, the consolidated AIM inventory is more than 
23,600 munitions larger than the baseline inventory, 






Plan AIM Plan 
AMRAAM 42.25% 81.36% 70.50% 
GBU-24 Kit 49.54% 81.36% 74.21% 
GBU-16 Kit 73.03% 87.75% 99.99% 
GBU-12 Kit 34.88% 81.36% 100.00% 
GBU-10 Kit 63.56% 81.36% 95.76% 
Maverick 100.00% 100.00% 67.53% 
Hellfire 33.19% 81.36% 92.46% 
HARM 94.96% 91.39% 67.95% 
Sidewinder 79.87% 91.69% 98.98% 
JDAM 32.79% 81.36% 77.39% 
JSOW (Unitary) 3.40% 81.36% 90.39% 
JSOW (Baseline) 22.60% 83.17% 84.35% 
MK84 72.29% 98.62% 100.00% 
MK83 78.59% 81.36% 100.00% 
MK82 48.25% 92.98% 96.84% 
Tomahawk 109E 5.91% 81.65% 85.98% 
Tomahawk UGM109D 37.74% 82.77% 70.57% 
Tomahawk RGM109D 42.02% 82.30% 85.55% 
SLAM-ER 86.54% 100.00% 100.00% 
Table 6. Inventory Comparison of Initial 
Inventory to BASELINE Plan and AIM Plan (End-
of-Year 8 Relative Inventories) 
Inventory values are given for the quantity of 
munitions in the active inventory, relative to 
the Total Munition Requirement (TMR) - at the 
beginning of Year 1 (Initial Inventory) and at 
















































































































Figure 7. Comparison of BASELINE Plan and AIM 
Plan (End-of-Year 8 Relative Inventories) 
Individual munition relative inventory levels are 
shown as a percentage of TMR, determined from the 
active inventory counts at the end of year 8, for 
the AIM plan and the BASELINE plan.  AIM achieves 
larger individual munition inventories for 
thirteen of nineteen munitions. 
 
Alternately, the two solutions can be compared by the 
tier level metric for measuring capability of a munitions 
inventory.  With this metric AIM does even better.  The 
same baseline plan is considered; with the AIM tier level 
structure applied to the resulting Year 8 inventories.  
These are compared to the AIM plan in Table 7 and are shown 
graphically in Figure 8.  Compared this way, AIM achieves a 
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tier level as good as or better than the BASELINE plan in 







Plan AIM Plan 
AMRAAM 3 12 11 
GBU-24 Kit 5 11 11 
GBU-16 Kit 13 15 15 
GBU-12 Kit 4 15 16 
GBU-10 Kit 11 14 14 
Maverick 16 16 11 
Hellfire 2 11 12 
HARM 14 14 11 
Sidewinder 12 14 15 
JDAM 1 11 11 
JSOW (Unitary) 1 11 12 
JSOW (Baseline) 2 12 12 
MK84 11 14 16 
MK83 14 14 16 
MK82 6 14 14 
Tomahawk 109E 1 12 14 
Tomahawk UGM109D 3 14 12 
Tomahawk RGM109D 3 11 12 
SLAM-ER 11 16 16 
Table 7. Tier Level Comparison of Initial 
Inventory to BASELINE Plan and AIM Plan (End-
of-Year 8 Tier Levels) 
Tier level values are determined from active 
inventory counts at the beginning of Year 1 
(Initial Inventory) and at the end of Year 8 
(BASELINE and AIM plans).  AIM achieves tier 
levels as good as or better than the BASELINE 

































































































Figure 8. Comparison of BASELINE Plan and AIM 
Plan (End-of-Year 8 Tier Levels) 
Individual munition tier levels measured from 
active inventory counts at the end of year 8 are 
shown, for the AIM plan and the baseline plan.  
AIM achieves tier levels as good as or better 
than the BASELINE plan for fifteen of the 
nineteen munitions. 
 
While comparison of inventory size and capability at 
the end of year 8 both indicate that AIM is superior, the 
end-of-time-horizon states may not be the most appropriate 
comparison.  The agencies involved in munitions planning 
attempt to generate estimates for expenditures, 
requirements, and procurements for an eight- to ten-year 
period, but they recognize that the accuracy of those 
estimates erodes rapidly as they look further into the 
future.  In fact, the most critical period for these 
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estimates is from two to four years into the future due to 
the length of time required for the military planning, 
programming, and budgeting POM horizon.  Therefore, the 
effect that a procurement plan has on the capability of the 
inventory in these near years is probably a more 
significant judge of its value.   
Figures 9, 10, and 11 compare the individual munition 
capability tier levels from AIM and the BASELINE plan 
calculated from inventory counts at the end of years 2, 3, 
and 4, respectively.  In these years, AIM achieves 
individual tier levels as good as or better than the 
BASELINE plan for fourteen, fifteen, and thirteen 





























































































 Figure 9. Comparison of BASELINE Plan and AIM 
Plan (End-of-Year 2 Tier Levels) 
Individual munition tier levels measured from the 
active inventory counts at the end of year 2 are 
shown, for the AIM plan and the BASELINE plan.  
AIM achieves tier levels as good as or better 
than the BASELINE plan for fourteen of the 




























































































 Figure 10. Comparison of BASELINE Plan and AIM 
Plan (End-of-Year 3 Tier Levels) 
Individual munition tier levels measured from the 
active inventory counts at the end of year 3 are 
shown, for the AIM plan and the BASELINE plan.  
AIM achieves tier levels as good as or better 



































































































 Figure 11. Comparison of BASELINE Plan and AIM 
Plan (End-of-Year 4 Tier Levels) 
Individual munition tier levels measured from the 
active inventory counts at the end of year 4 are 
shown, for the AIM plan and the BASELINE plan.  
AIM achieves tier levels as good as or better 
than the BASELINE plan for thirteen of the 
nineteen munitions. 
 
The smoothing effect of AIM is even more significant.  
AIM is more effective at improving the inventory count of 
munitions with low tier levels while simply sustaining 
those with high tier levels.  Table 8 shows a comparison of 
the population standard deviation of individual munition 
tier levels for years 2 through 4.  AIM achieves lower 
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variance in individual munition capability in each of these 
three years, and also reduces the variability by more than 
25% in this time period, while the BASELINE plan produces 
only a 14% improvement. 
 
Table 8. Comparison of the Variability of 
Munition Tier Levels Between BASELINE Plan and 
AIM Plan  
Population standard deviation of the nineteen 
individual munition tier levels for Years 2, 3, 
and 4 from the BASELINE plan and the AIM plan are 
shown.  AIM achieves lower tier level variability 
in each year and a significantly better reduction 
in variability over this same period. 
 
Conducting a side-by-side comparison of the BASELINE 
plan with the AIM plan for all eight years indicates that 
AIM is superior throughout the entire planning horizon.  
Figure 12 shows the number of individual munitions (out of 
nineteen) for which the capability achieved by AIM is as 
good as or better than the capability provided by the 
BASELINE plan, by year. 
 
 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
BASELINE plan 5.18 5.09 4.45 
























 Figure 12. Summary of AIM-Improved Capability 
Munitions (By Year) 
AIM consistently achieves a tier level as good as 
or better than the BASELINE plan for a majority 
of the munitions --- in most years, approximately 
2/3 of all munitions --- throughout the entire 
planning horizon. 
 
Similarly, the minimum tier achieved by all munitions 
in a given year is a key indicator of the overall 
capability of the entire inventory.  Once again, AIM is 
superior to the BASELINE plan.  In particular, as shown in 
Figure 13, the minimum tier level achieved by AIM rapidly 




Figure 13. Comparison of Minimum Tier Levels (By 
Year) 
The minimum tier level achieved by all individual 
munitions in each year of the plan is shown, for 
the AIM plan and the BASELINE plan.  The AIM 
minimum tier level jumps quickly in year 2 and 
again in years 4 through 6 while the BASELINE 
plan minimum tier lags behind.  Due to the length 
of the planning, programming, and budgeting 
process, the budgets for the first two years are 
fairly fixed.  The next two years are critical, 
these are the budgets that are currently being 
planned.  Beyond year four are important planning 
years, current procurement plans will be revised 






































Planning munitions procurement for the U.S. Navy is a 
complicated task with many agencies involved and a 
significant amount of money at stake (currently nearly $2 
billion per year).  Currently, there is no objective 
mathematical model to support analysts with these complex 
decisions.  Our BASELINE model provides this. 
The current practice of equating relative size of the 
inventory (measured against NNOR Total Munition 
Requirement) with capability neglects to consider the four 
component NNOR requirements and the priorities on the 
variety of potential uses for any munition.  The tier level 
metric provides a munition-specific measure of capability 
and the minimum tier level achieved by all munitions in a 
given year provides an objective yardstick for measuring 
the overall combat effectiveness of the total inventory.   
Factors that must be considered by procurement 
analysts include industrial base constraints, maintenance 
scheduling, quantity-based pricing, and NNOR component 
requirements.  The Assessment and Investment Model (AIM) is 
an effective tool for managing all of these considerations 
and generating multi-year procurement recommendations by 
placing priority munitions with low tier levels and 
maximizing the budget available to increase the overall 
combat effectiveness of the inventory.  As increasingly 
sophisticated weapons, many of which are designed for 
special purposes, become more common in the inventory, the 
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ability to optimize any given budget in order to satisfy 
these complex requirements will be essential. 
Together with the AIM spreadsheet interface, this 
decision support system can provide multi-year munitions 
procurement plans that will improve the capability of the 
munition inventory.  The Naval Ammunition Logistics Center 
has provided critical guidance throughout the development 
of AIM and intends to use AIM for POM planning beginning 
this fall. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are many unexplored opportunities for the 
continuation of this work.  Two have primary significance:   
improve the fidelity of the model, and improve the 
responsiveness and quality of the suggested plans. 
The actual scheduling, performing, and pricing 
maintenance on complex munitions is much more complicated 
than is portrayed in AIM.  An initial goal has been to 
identify maintenance conducted at a Navy facility 
separately from maintenance done at a contractor facility 
and represent maintenance costs more accurately, similar to 
procurement pricing.  Ultimately, the data on hand could 
not support this level of detail, but additional data 
gathering may support this. 
AIM uses GAMS and an off-the-shelf solver, such as 
CPLEX, for even modestly sized planning problems.  Ideally, 
this tool should be available to procurement analysts, 
program managers, even commanders in the fleet - none of 
whom are likely to have access to GAMS or a solver.  For 
practical purposes, a fast heuristic could be used by any 
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interested party with commonly available software and a 
more powerful GAMS model could be offered by a central 
agency (say, NALC) to certify that the heuristic plans are 
objectively of good quality.  We have tried to solve AIM 
with several basic myopic heuristics.  While the plans 
generated by these heuristics did not result in inventories 
as capable as those from AIM-generated plans, the 
heuristics did provide valuable insight into the problem.  
A more concerted effort at advanced heuristics, perhaps one 
based on those described by Senju and Toyoda, 1968, and 
Toyoda, 1975, may be able to produce a tool that can 
generate solutions comparable to AIM and yet be more 
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AMRAAM 55 388 1
GBU-24 Kit 100 5000 1
GBU-16 Kit 200 18000 1
GBU-12 Kit 200 18000 1
GBU-10 Kit 200 18000 1
Maverick 100 2500 1
Hellfire 200 2700 1
HARM 50 500 1
Sidewinder 100 2056 1
JDAM 1000 12725 1
JSOW (Unitary) 120 600 1
JSOW (Baseline) 300 660 1
MK84 1200 14400 1
MK83 5000 57600 1
MK82 10000 57600 1
Tomahawk 109E 70 504 1
Tomahawk UGM109D 20 504 1
Tomahawk RGM109D 50 104 1
SLAM-ER 30 174 1  
Table 9. Munition Production Data 
Minimum Sustaining Rate (MSR) and Maximum 
Production Rate (MPR) are given for 
munition categories per year.  Production 
Delay is the length of time for procured 






















AMRAAM 0 0 0 0 0
GBU-24 Kit 0 0 0 0 0
GBU-16 Kit 0 0 0 0 0
GBU-12 Kit 0 0 0 0 0
GBU-10 Kit 0 0 0 0 0
Maverick 0 0 0 0 0
Hellfire 0 0 0 0 0
HARM 0 0 0 0 0
Sidewinder 5 0.01 100 5886 0
JDAM 0 0 0 0 0
JSOW (Unitary) 0 0 0 0 0
JSOW (Baseline) 0 0 0 0 0
MK84 0 0 0 0 0
MK83 0 0 0 0 0
MK82 0 0 0 0 0
Tomahawk 109E 5 0.3 0 500 0
Tomahawk UGM109D 5 0.3 0 500 0
Tomahawk RGM109D 5 0.3 0 500 0
SLAM-ER 5 0.02 0 350 0  Table 10. Munition Maintenance Data 
Cycle Length is the number of years between 
scheduled maintenance.  Maintenance Cost is in 
M$.  Minimum and Maximum Maintenance Rates are in 
munition counts per year.  Maintenance Delay is 
the time from when a munition begins maintenance 
until it is again combat useable, in years. 
 
 
Family 1: GBU-16 Kit
GBU-12 Kit
Family 2: JSOW (Unitary)
JSOW (Baseline)
Family 3: Tomahawk 109E
Tomahawk UGM109D







1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AMRAAM
Lot Count 0 55 120 190 290 388
Lot Cost 35 28.5 62 85 117 151
Unit Cost 0.5182 0.9538 1.2143 1.17 1.5408
GBU-24 Kit
Lot Count 0 100 1000 3000 5000
Lot Cost 2 5.5 54 165 270
Unit Cost 0.055 0.06 0.0825 0.135
GBU-16 Kit
Lot Count 0 200 1000 3000 6000 12000 18000
Lot Cost 2 3.4 15 46 92 184 276
Unit Cost 0.017 0.0188 0.023 0.0307 0.0307 0.046
GBU-12 Kit
Lot Count 0 200 1000 3000 6000 12000 18000
Lot Cost 2 3.4 15 46 92 184 276
Unit Cost 0.017 0.0188 0.023 0.0307 0.0307 0.046
GBU-10 Kit
Lot Count 0 200 1000 3000 6000 12000 18000
Lot Cost 2 4.6 22 64.5 126 240 342
Unit Cost 0.023 0.0275 0.0323 0.042 0.04 0.057
Maverick
Lot Count 0 100 600 1200 1800 2500
Lot Cost 5 16 93 178 265 350
Unit Cost 0.16 0.186 0.2967 0.4417 0.5
Hellfire
Lot Count 0 200 800 1500 2000 2700
Lot Cost 3 11 45 83 110 140
Unit Cost 0.055 0.075 0.1186 0.22 0.2
HARM
Lot Count 0 50 160 250 400 500
Lot Cost 15 18 53 75 112 135
Unit Cost 0.36 0.4818 0.8333 0.7467 1.35
Munition
Lots
 Table 12. Munition Cost Data I 
Lot Count (in munition counts), Lot Cost (in M$), 
and Unit Cost (in M$ per count) are provided for 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sidewinder
Lot Count 0 100 200 450 1000 1500 2050
Lot Cost 25 26 43 83 163 220 290
Unit Cost 0.26 0.43 0.332 0.2964 0.44 0.5273
JDAM
Lot Count 0 1000 5000 7000 9000 11000 12725
Lot Cost 15 50 122 161 207 253 285
Unit Cost 0.05 0.0305 0.0805 0.1035 0.1265 0.1652
JSOW (Unitary)
Lot Count 0 120 175 300 450 600
Lot Cost 35 39 57 86 113 156
Unit Cost 0.325 1.0364 0.688 0.7533 1.04
JSOW (Baseline)
Lot Count 0 300 450 660
Lot Cost 70 85 111 142
Unit Cost 0.2833 0.74 0.6762
MK84
Lot Count 0 1200 4000 10000 14400
Lot Cost 10 15 50 125 181
Unit Cost 0.0125 0.0179 0.0208 0.0411
MK83
Lot Count 0 5000 20000 40000 57600
Lot Cost 25 30 120 240 343
Unit Cost 0.006 0.008 0.012 0.0195
MK82
Lot Count 0 10000 16000 34000 57600
Lot Cost 20 26 42 92 150
Unit Cost 0.0026 0.007 0.0051 0.0064
Tomahawk 109E
Lot Count 0 140 200 325 400 504
Lot Cost 150 205 252 353 416 494
Unit Cost 1.4643 4.2 2.824 5.5467 4.75
Munition
Lots
 Table 13. Munition Cost Data II 
Lot Count (in munition counts), Lot Cost (in M$), 
and Unit Cost (in M$ per count) are provided for 
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Tomahawk UGM109D
Lot Count 0 140 200 325 400 504
Lot Cost 150 205 252 353 416 494
Unit Cost 1.4643 4.2 2.824 5.5467 4.75
Tomahawk RGM109D
Lot Count 0 140 200 325 400 504
Lot Cost 150 205 252 353 416 494
Unit Cost 1.4643 4.2 2.824 5.5467 4.75
SLAM-ER
Lot Count 0 30 50 100 140 174
Lot Cost 30 30 41 63 84 106
Unit Cost 1 2.05 1.26 2.1 3.1176
Munition
Lots
 Table 14. Munition Cost Data III 
Lot Count (in munitions), Lot Cost (in M$), and 
Unit Cost (in M$ per count) are provided for the 
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APPENDIX B. AIM MODEL FORMULATION  
A. INDICES AND SETS 
m∈M  Munition, any munition for which NNOR 
requirements are generated, currently this is 190 
possible munitions 
y∈Y Year of the planning horizon, Y={1,...,8} 
t∈T Tier level, T={1,...,num_tiers} 
l∈L Procurement pricing lot, L={1,...,10}, there may 
be up to ten different pricing lots identified 
for each munition 
f∈F Munition facility, F={1,...,fmax} where fmax is the 
total number of facilities being modeled 
 
B. DATA 
num_lotsm Number of procurement pricing 
lots actually used for munition m 
lot_countm,l Number of munition m in lot l 
lot_costm,l Procurement cost for the full 
quantity of lot l of munition m 
unit_costm,l Unit cost per munition m in lot 
l.  Every munition must have at 
least two lots.  For all m, 
lot_countm,’1’=0, and lot_costm,’1’ 
is the penalty charged for 
violating the minimum sustaining 
rate for production.  Subsequent 
lot counts and costs represent 
price reductions due to quantity 
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purchasing.  Counts and costs are 
cumulative; use these values as 
you would a table (interpolating 
linearly between given values) to 
determine the total cost for a 
desired quantity 
mun_facilitym,f Value of 1 indicates munition m 
is produced at production 
facility f and maintained at 
maintenance facility f’, 0 
required otherwise 
min_sust_ratem Minimum production Sustaining 
Rate (MSR) for munition m 
max_prod_ratem Maximum Production Rate (MPR) for 
munition m 
prev_procurem,y Number of munition m to be 
delivered in year y from previous 
procurements (before beginning of 
AIM planning horizon) 
init_inventm Initial on-hand inventory of 
munition m at the beginning of 
the planning horizon 
delivery_delaym Number of years delay for 
delivery of new procurements of 
munition m 
init_maint_duem,y Number of munition m in the 
initial inventory due for 
maintenance in year y 
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maint_cyclem Time between scheduled 
maintenance for munition m, if no 
routine maintenance is required, 
this value must be large (>8) 
maint_costm Unit cost of maintenance for 
munition m 
maint_delaym Number of years to return a 
maintained weapon m to the active 
inventory 
max_maint_ratem Maximum annual maintenance rate 
for munition m 
min_maint_ratem Minimum annual maintenance 
sustaining rate for munition m 
expend_trngm,y Expected annual training 
expenditures for munition m in 
year y 
expend_opsm,y Estimated annual operational 
expenditures for munition m in 
year y 
proc_budget_lowy Lower bound for annual 
procurement budget band in year y 
proc_budget_uppy Upper bound for annual 
procurement budget band in year y 
maint_budgety Upper bound for annual 
maintenance budget in year y 
disc_rate 8-year discount rate for future 





linearly interpolated between 
given values   
mpr_lotm For munition m, lot number into 
which MPR falls 
msr_lotm For munition m, lot number into 
which MSR falls 
mpr_costm Cost for the MPR quantity of 
munition m 
msr_costm Cost for the MSR quantity of 
munition m 
max_prod_costf Max annual production output of 
facility f, in total production 
costs 
min_sust_costf Min annual production output to 
sustain facility f, in total 
production costs 
msr_penf Monetary penalty for violation of 
facility f’s MSR 
mpr_pen_ratef Proportional additional penalty 
cost to facility f for exceeding 
its MPR 
max_maint_costf Max annual maintenance output of 
facility f, in total maintenance 
costs 
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min_maint_costf Min annual output to sustain 
maintenance facility f, in total 
maintenance costs 
excess_maint_rate Proportional increase in 
maintenance costs for exceeding 
the maximum maintenance rate 
persist 1 if this is to be solved as a 
persistent solution 
cold2hot 1 to prohibit cold facilities 
from going hot in a designated 
number of years 
hot2cold 1 to prohibit hot facilities from 
going cold in a designated number 
of years 
cold2hot_time Number of years to enforce cold 
to hot constraint 
hot2cold_time Number of years to enforce hot to 
cold constraint 
change_limit 1 to enforce restrictions on 
changes in procurement quantities 
by year 
change_percenty Limit, as a percentage, to the 
allowable change in procurements 
of each munition, from the 
incumbent solution, in year y 
num_procm,y Number of munition m procured in 
year y in the incumbent solution 
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of_wtsy Objective function weights, by 
year y 
holding_penaltym Objective function penalty for 
"holding" a munition m in 
maintenance rather than 
performing the maintenance 
budget_penaltyy Objective function penalty for 
underspending the procurement 
budget lower bound in year y 
num_tiers Number of tier levels in the tier 
formulation 
tier_lvlm,t,y Number of weapons of type m in 
year y required to reach tier t 
 
C. VARIABLES 
PROCUREDm,y Number of munition m procured 
during year y 
LOT_PROCUREDm,l,y Number of munition m procured 
from lot l in year y 
PROC_COSTm,y Total cost of procurement of 
munition m in year y 
DELIVEREDm,y Number of munition m delivered 
during year y from both new 
procurement and maintenance 
ACTIVE_INVm,y Number of munition m in the 
usable inventory at the end of 
year y 
  75
MAINT_INVm,y Number of munition m awaiting 
maintenance (not usable) at the 
end of year y 
MAINT_DUEm,y Number of munition m due for 
maintenance during year y 
MAINT_RTNm,y Number of munition m returned 
from maintenance (again usable) 
during year y 
MAINT_SLACKf,y Maintenance throughput of 
facility f below the minimum 
maintenance sustaining rate in 
year y, in total maintenance 
costs 
MAINT_SURPLUSf,y Maintenance throughput of 
facility f above the maximum 
maintenance rate in year y, in 
total maintenance costs 
MIN_MAINT_PENf,y Monetary penalty for violation of 
the minimum maintenance rate for 
facility f in year y 
MAX_MAINT_PENf,y  Monetary penalty for violation of 
the maximum maintenance rate for 
facility f in year y 
OVERPRODf,y Value of munitions procured in 
year y from facility f above the 
value of the Max Production Rate 
MPR_PENf,y Amount of penalty paid for 
procurements in excess of MPR at 
facility f in year y 
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MIN_TIERy Minimum tier achieved of all 
munitions in year y 
SPEND_SLACKy Slack variable for spending below 
the procurement budget lower 
bound in year y 
 
PERS_SLACKm,y Slack variable for quantity of 
munition m by which persistence 
goals were not met in year y 
COLD_SLACKf,y Slack variable for persistence 
goals, a 1 indicates a failure to 
keep facility f “cold” in year y 
of the updated solution 
HOT_SLACKf,y Slack variable for persistence 
goals, a 1 indicates a failure to 
keep facility f “hot” in year y 
of the updated solution 
CUM_TIER_REACHEDm,t,y Binary variable, 1 if munition m 
is in tier t or below in year y 
LOT_INDICATORm,l,y Binary variable, 1 if munition m 
is being procured in lot l during 
year y 
MEET_MSRf,y Binary variable, 1 if facility f 









ACTIVE_INV  = init_invent +DELIVERED, ,
-MAINT_DUE -expend_trng -expend_ops, , ,
m y m m y
m y m y m y




 , , , '
+MAINT_RTN
DELIVERED = prev_procure +PROCUREDm y m y m y
m,y''
 , ,, -1
- ,
MAINT_INV = MAINT_INV +MAINT_DUE
MAINT_RTN
























D. CONSTRAINTS AND OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
MAXIMIZE 
of_wts * MIN_TIER COLD_SLACK +HOT_SLACK PERS_SLACKf,y f,y
ACTIVE_INV -budget_penalty *SPEND_SLACK -holding_penalty *MAINT_INV,
,




m y y y m m,y
m y
m num tiers y
m
              











   ∀m, y=1 (1) 
 
  
 ∀m,y>1 (2) 
 
  tier_lvl 1ACTIVE_INV , m,'',ym y ≥  ∀m,y (3) 
 
  
 ∀m,y (4) 
  ∀y’=y-delivery_delaym  
  ∀y’’=y-maint_delaym 
 
 -, , ,MAINT_INV = MAINT_DUE MAINT_RTNm y m y m y  ∀m,y=1  (5) 
 
  
 ∀m,y>1 (6) 
 
  









 ∀f,y (9) 
 




'-1MAINT_RTN *maint_cost *(1-disc_rate), '
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 ∀f,y (19) 
 
*OVERPROD, ,MPR_PEN mpr_pen_ratef y f f y=  ∀f,y (20) 
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MEET_MSR num_proc *mun_facility +COLD_SLACKm,yf,y f,ym,f
m
   ≤ ∑
num_proc *mun_facility
MEET_MSR -HOT_SLACKnum_proc *mun_facility +1
m,y m,fm
f,y f,ym,y m,fm
   











If persist=1 and change_limit=1 and change_percenty>0, 
  
 ∀m,y (28) 
 
If persist=1 and change_limit=1 and change_percenty>0, 
  
 ∀m,y (29) 
 
If persist=1 and cold2hot=1 and cold2hot_time>y, 
  
 
 ∀f,y (30) 
 




 ∀f,y (31) 
 
PROCUREDm,y, LOT_PROCUREDm,l,y, PROC_COSTm,y, DELIVEREDm,y, 
ACTIVE_INVm,y, MAINT_INVm,y, MAINT_DUEm,y, MAINT_RTNm,y, 
MAINT_SLACKf,y, MAINT_SURPLUSf,y, MIN_MAINT_PENf,y, 
MAX_MAINT_PENf,y, OVERPRODf,y, MPR_PENf,y, MIN_TIERy, 
SPEND_SLACKy, PERS_SLACKy, 
COLD_SLACKy, HOT_SLACKy ≥ 0 ∀m,y,t,l (32) 
 
CUM_TIER_REACHEDm,t,y, LOT_INDICATORm,l,y, 
 MEET_MSRf,y are Binary ∀m,y,t,l (33)  
 
E. BRIEF VERBAL DESCRIPTION 
The objective function expresses the weighted sum of 
the annual minimum tier achieved, less penalties for 
violations of persistence, plus the sum of annual 
inventories as a proportion of the total desired inventory, 
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less penalties for underspending on procurement and 
delaying maintenance. 
Constraints: 
(1-2) Together, these are inventory balance equations 
for each active (combat useable) munition. 
(3) Each constraint requires that the minimum active 
inventory of a munition be maintained every 
year. 
(4) Each constraint determines the number of a newly 
produced or maintained munition that is 
delivered in a given year. 
(5-6) Together, these are inventory balance equations 
for a unusable munition that is waiting for 
maintenance. 
(7) Maintenance scheduling equations; these 
determine the number of a munition that are due 
for maintenance in a given year. 
(8-9)  These elastic constraints enforce the 
maintenance base for the minimum and maximum 
maintenance throughput, in cost, in a given year 
for a given facility.  A violation 
(MAINT_SLACKf,y and MAINT_SURPLUSf,y) results in 
an increased maintenance cost. 
(10-11) These equations determine the penalties for a 
violation of a maintenance base constraint. 
(12) Each constraint limits cumulative maintenance 
spending (including penalties) by the cumulative 
maintenance budget.   
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(13) This equation determines the total number of a 
munition procured in a given year by summing 
procurements over all individual lots. 
(14-16) Together, these constraints require that an 
individual lot procurement is no larger in count 
than the count of the entire lot (or the NNOR 
total requirement when purchasing from the last 
lot) and that a munition may not be procured 
from the next lot without procuring the entire 
previous lot. 
(17) Each elastic constraint restricts procurement 
production at a facility by the maximum 
production rate (MPR).  A violation (OVERPRODf,y) 
results in a penalty which increases procurement 
cost. 
(18-19) Together, these constraints determine whether 
the minimum sustaining production rate (MSR) for 
a facility has been met.  A failure to meet the 
MSR results in a penalty on overall procurement 
spending. 
(20) Each equation determines the penalty for a 
violation of a facility’s MPR. 
(21) Each equation determines the total cost of new 
procurement of a single munition in a given 
year. 
(22-23) Together these constraints enforce the upper and 
lower bounds on cumulative procurement budget 
spending, discounted for future years and 
including penalties. 
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(24-25) Together, these constraints determine which tier 
has been reached based on a current (active) 
inventory count. 
(26) These constraints require the tier reached 
indicator variable to be non-decreasing. 
(27) Each constraint determines the minimum tier 
achieved in a given year. 
(28-29) These constraints are active only when a 
persistent recommendation is desired.  Together 
they require the quantity of a munition procured 
in a given year to be within a relative range of 
the quantity from the original recommendation. 
(30-31) These elastic constraints require that a 
facility does not change status in the revised 
plan from “cold” to “hot” or “hot” to “cold” for 
a designated number of years.  A violation 
(COLD_SLACKf,y and HOT-SLACKf,y) is penalized in 
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APPENDIX C. AIM USER’S GUIDE 
The following are the general steps required to 
prepare the necessary data to solve a munition procurement 
problem with AIM. 
 
Step 1: Generate tier level tables. 
The percentages that apply to specific NNOR 
requirements can be adjusted to any series of non-
decreasing levels (from Level F, the poorest, to Level A, 
the best) if necessary to better focus on the range of 
current munition inventories.  Similarly, the progression 
up through these mission capability levels may be changed 
from the current structure shown in this paper.  Fewer than 
sixteen tier levels may be used, but not more than sixteen 
(i.e., this is an implementation limit).  Tier 1 should 
represent the smallest acceptable munition inventory; the 
highest tier used should equal the NNOR TMR. 
Setting the mission area priorities for each munition 
can be done with input from the agencies involved in 
munition procurement planning and inventory management as 
well as from the program manager responsible for that 
munition.  The key question to be answered in determining 
these priorities is, “If supply of this munition is 
limited, for which mission area is it most critical that 
this munition be available in its desired quantity?” 
Following calculation of the tier level values for 
each tier by munition and year, these values should be 
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listed in table format in a comma-delimited text file named 
“tierLevels.txt”.  The format is as follows: 
 Line 1:  dummy, dummy, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
Subsequent lines:  munition name, tier number, tier 
level values for each of the eight years 
 
Step 2: Assign munition families. 
The AIM formulation recognizes munition-family 
assignments by the “mun_facility” variable indexed by 
munition and facility.  A “1” indicates the munition is a 
member of the family produced at this facility, a “0” is 
necessary otherwise. 
The values of the “mun_facility” variable should be 
contained in a comma-delimited text file in table format 
named “FacilityTable.txt”.  The format includes the 
facility designators, as column headings (led by a single 
dummy placeholder), in the first line, and the munition 
names as rows followed by a “0” or “1” as indicated above 
for each facility. 
Two text files indicating the set of munitions and the 
set of facilities can be prepared at this time.  The 
former, titled “munitionSet.txt”, should lead with a single 
forward slash (“/”), then each munition name followed by a 
comma should be listed on a separate line (the last 
munition should not be followed by a comma).  The last line 
of the file should consist of simply a single forward slash 
(“/”).  The file containing the set of facilities should be 
named “facilitySet.txt” and have a similar format. 
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Step 3: Prepare munition data. 
All industrial base and maintenance throughput 
constraints are given in number of munitions.  These values 
should refer to constraints on individual munitions 
production and maintenance; the individual constraints will 
be converted into family constraints within AIM.  Time 
quantities are always in units of years.  Of note are the 
three types of maintenance requirement: 
1. No regular maintenance required.  For these 
munitions, the value given for length of the maintenance 
cycle should be large (>8). 
2. Regular maintenance required.  For these 
munitions, the length of the maintenance cycle represents 
the number of years between regularly scheduled 
maintenance.  The maintenance cost is given in M$ per 
munition maintained. 
3. Limited lifespan.  Some munitions require no 
regular maintenance, but there is some time limit to their 
useful life.  For these munitions, the maintenance cycle 
length should be set to the given lifespan and the 
maintenance cost should be very large (perhaps 999 M$) to 
preclude any effort at maintenance of these munitions. 
Munition data is provided to AIM in three text files.  
The first file, titled “MunitionData.txt” contains 
individual munition data that is constant over all years.  
This file requires no leading or trailing lines, and for 
each munition, the following format should be used: 
Init_invent(‘munition name’)= value ; 
Maint_cycle(‘munition name’)= value ; 
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Maint_cost(‘munition name’)= value ; 
Min_sust_rate(‘munition name’)= value ; 
Max_prod_rate(‘munition name’)= value ; 
Min_maint_rate(‘munition name’)= value ; 
Max_maint_rate(‘munition name’)= value ; 
delivery_delay(‘munition name’)= value ; 
Maint_delay(‘munition name’)= value ; 
num_lots(‘munition name’)= value ; 
 
The second file contains munition data that varies by 
year.  It is a comma-delimited file in table format and 
should be named “MunitionTable1.txt”.  The lead line 
consists of two dummy placeholders and then the values 1 
through 8 (years).  Each munition will be represented in 
four rows.  The first two elements in each row will be the 
munition name and a numeral 1 through 5.  The rows numbered 
1 will indicate annual maintenance requirements for the 
munitions in the current (beginning) inventory.  The rows 
numbered 2 will show the number of previously procured 
munitions that will arrive in each year.  The rows numbered 
3 and 4 provide annual expected training and operational 
expenditures, respectively.  The rows numbered 5 provide 
the original solution (in values of the quantity of this 
munition procured in each year) when the model will be 
solved to include persistence constraints. 
The third file is also a comma-delimited file in table 
format and should be named “MunitionTable2.txt”.  This file 
contains the procurement cost data.  The lead line consists 
of two dummy placeholders and then the values 1 through 10 
(lots).  Each munition will be represented in two rows.  
The first two elements in each row will be the munition 
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name and a numeral 1 or 2.  The rows numbered 1 will 
indicate lot size (quantities of munitions) for 
increasingly larger lots.  The rows numbered 2 will provide 
lot costs for each lot.  An important note is that while 
most munitions will probably be represented in fewer than 
ten lots, there must be a total of eleven delimiters to 
represent all twelve columns (two for munition and row 
indicator, ten for lots). 
 
Step 4: Set global variables. 
Determine minimum and maximum procurement budget 
values, by year, and allowable maintenance budget, by year.  
Due to fixed cost penalties for violations of Minimum 
Sustaining Rate, there is a minimum budget allowance that 
is necessary to guarantee feasibility.  The cumulate 
accounting of procurement spending provides some 
flexibility, but the sum of the MSR penalties over all 
facilities determines the minimum annual procurement 
budget. 
 
Step 5: If desired, set persistence parameters and 
provide a legacy plan. 
Persistence requirements can be imposed in two general 
areas:  individual munition annual procurement, and change 
to the industrial base.  In order to apply persistence 
constraints, the number of each munition procured, by year, 
in the legacy plan is provided as a parameter to AIM. 
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The global parameters and persistence options will be 
contained in a final comma-delimited text file in table 
format.  The lead line consists of one dummy placeholder 
and then the values 1 through 8 (years).  Following are 
five lines; they begin with the values 1 through 3, 5, and 
6 (4 is currently unused).  The rows numbered 1 and 2 
provide the minimum and maximum procurement budget, 
respectively, for each year.  The row numbered 3 provides 
the allowable maintenance budget for each year. 
The row numbered 5 indicates a different, single 
quantity in each of the columns (for this row the columns 
do not correspond to years).  With the number 5 in the 
first position, the second position holds the discount rate 
to be used (as a quantity from 0.0 to 1.00).  The third 
position holds the overall persistence indicator, a “1” to 
allow persistence constraints, a “0” otherwise.  The 
fourth, fifth, and sixth positions contain the indicators 
for the constraints on industrial base and procurement 
quantity changes.  A “1” in the fourth position activates 
the constraint preventing inactive facilities from becoming 
active.  A “1” in the fifth position activates the 
constraint preventing active facilities from becoming 
inactive.  A “1” in the sixth position activates the 
constraint limiting the allowed relative change to 
individual munition procurement quantities.  Note that in 
order for any of these three individual persistence options 
to be activated, the overall persistence indicator (in 
position three) must also be set to “1”.  The seventh and 
eighth positions provide the length of time (in number of 
years) for the change in industrial base constraints to be 
in effect (provided they are activated as described above).  
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Finally, the ninth position should indicate the number of 
tiers used in the chosen tier structure. 
The row numbered six contains the fraction of change 
allowed, by year, to individual munition procurements, when 
this constraint is activated. 
 
The steps above will generate eight text files 
required by AIM.  Upon successfully solving a problem, the 
basic results (to include quantity of munitions procured 
and quantity of munitions maintained, by munition and year, 
and total procurement spending and total maintenance 
spending, by year) are reported in a comma-delimited text 
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